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Abstract Izydora Da˛mbska was one of the most outstanding representatives of the
Lvov-Warsaw School and a disciple of both the School’s founder Kazimierz
Twardowski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Interest in the School was the result of
Twardowski’s program of scientific philosophy, which was adopted by the vast
majority of his students. This program assumed that the basic condition for prac-
ticing philosophy in a scientific manner is the precise use of language by a
philosopher. One of the scholars who devoted most attention to language was
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Da˛mbska accepted that the philosophical program of the
School was opposed to the trend shared by many contemporary schools at the time
which belonged to the so called current of linguistic philosophy. According to this
trend, language is the only object of philosophical investigation. The analysis of
Ajdukiewicz’s concept of language is one of her most interesting achievements in
the domain of philosophy of language. This concept, called by Da˛mbska ‘the
immanent concept of language’, is the basis of Ajdukiewicz’s well-known radical
conventionalism.
Keywords Da˛mbska  Ajdukiewicz  Language  Philosophy of language  The
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Linking philosophical considerations to those concerning language was the
perspective that Izydora Da˛mbska adopted from her teacher Kazimierz Twardowski.
According to the latter, a philosophy is able to meet the postulate of scientificity
provided its problems are formulated in a clear and precise way. This is possible
only if a philosopher uses language clearly, i.e. a language in which the meanings of
the words used are precisely defined (Hanusek 2012: 160–161). This in turn requires
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reflection on language. Discussing Da˛mbska’s achievements in the field of
semiotics, the Polish logician Jerzy Perzanowski writes:
Izydora Da˛mbka applied in an exemplary way the basic working method of
the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School: the method of semiotic-
logical analysis. She is one of the School’s masters of semiotic analysis with
the auxiliary use of logic. The backbone of the method is its subtle and
profound conceptual analysis of the description of the considered areas along
with the study of truth relationships between the propositions from the
contemplated or created theory’’ (Perzanowski 1998: 78).
Jerzy Pelc, in turn, states:
The interest in language in the Lvov-Warsaw School resulted from a program
demanding a more scientific philosophy which was (according to Da˛mbska)
the life-task of its founder—Kazimierz Twardowski. The basic elements of
this program were clarity and precision in formulating philosophical issues
and the postulate of a communicable philosophical language as well as
attention to detail in order to ensure that it carefully maps the content of views
under analysis. These views resulted in the adoption of the method of semiotic
analysis as the basic method of the philosophy that Twardowski defined as a
method of conceptual analysis or analysis of meanings (Da˛mbska 1969: 1–9).
Da˛mbska accepts the program of philosophy outlined by her teacher and takes
an interest in language, while stressing the need to avoid falling into the
extremes that have become the focus of many currents of modern linguistic
philosophy that treat language as the only object of investigation and the
method of linguistic analysis as its only task’ (Pelc 1986: 45).
Thus we can see clearly that Izydora Da˛mbska’s interest in language resulted from
her philosophical program. In this article I want to present the critical dimension of
Da˛mbska’s analysis.
Ajdukiwiecz’s philosophy in the context of the philosphy of language.
The semiotic character of language
Discussing Ajdukiewicz’s concept of language Da˛mbska classifies her teacher’s
views as an analytic philosophy within the moderate stream of so-called ‘linguistic
philosophy’. Ajdukiewicz’s concept of language can be described, Da˛mbska claims,
as immanentist. According to this view, language is an autonomous system that can
be subjected to analysis in a manner analogous to that of deductive systems; it is
conceived as a set of signs and directives for their combination (Da˛mbska 1967:
156). The basic concept analyzed by linguistic philosophy in all its varieties is the
concept of language and its functions. Thus the fundamental question that linguistic
philosophy faces is the question: what is language? And here Da˛mbska notes the
difficulty also shared by Ajdukiewicz:
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But is it even possible to ask such a question? There is still no such thing as
language. There are various specific languages: natural and artificial. Among
natural languages, there are ethnic languages, dialects, literary languages that
are more or less common to different people, or maybe always individual, but
somehow associated to allow speakers to understand each other. And among
artificial languages we distinguish formal and informal languages. Some of
these are mutually translatable some are not.1 Why are some vocal, kinetic or
graphic systems called languages? Answers to this question have been sought
by examining the semiotic functions of these lingual elements, starting from
the assumption that, regardless of whether we understand language as a
pragmatic type of human behavior, whether or not we consider it as a kind of
static objectified, intersubjectively conceived structure we are always dealing
with a domain of signs. The variety of language concepts is conditioned, I
think, by the multiformity of sign functions that determines the language
definition that is taken into account’ (Da˛mbska 1965: 3–9).
In analyzing Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s views on language Da˛mbska refers to three
of his works that were published before the war in the journal Erkenntnis,
subsequently published after the war in Polish translation in volume 1 of Language
and Cognition. These are: ‘‘Language and Meaning,’’ ‘‘The World-Picture and
Conceptual Apparatus’’ (Ajdukiewicz 1978: 35–66, 67–89) and ‘‘Scientific
Perspective on the World.’’ In these works the author described his main
philosophical view as radical conventionalism.2 According to him,’’Our proposed
definition of ‘‘meaning’’ is a definition that entails far-reaching consequences. This
is because it leads to the standpoint in the theory of knowledge, which we define as
radical conventionalism’ (Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c: 146). It is not our purpose in this
text to present a detailed discussion of Ajdukiewicz’s conception, instead we will
focus on Da˛mbska’s criticism directed against it in her: ‘‘On Linguistic Philosophy’’
and ‘‘The Concept of Language in Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Philosophy.’’3
1 It should be noted that a similar approach to the existence of a language is presented by Ajdukiewicz,
who states : ‘‘It follows that the colloquial term’’ language‘‘ is fluid in the same way as the concept of
’’quite substantial similarity.‘‘ (…) We conceive language so that its unambiguous characterization is not
sufficient by a more or less fixed arrangement between word and meaning, but requires quite a strict
assignment of meanings. Standing by the strict notion of a language we cannot say that there is one Polish
language, but we must say that there are many Polish languages, which may all be identical in sound, but
differ in—although not very much—assignments of words and meanings. In fact, you can enumerate
several Polish languages (ignoring different dialects and historical phases). There are several identical
sounding Polish colloquial languages, including a Polish language of physics, Polish medical language,
etc.-’’., Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c. 173).
2 Interesting comments on the similarity of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism and the concept of
Kuhn’s scientific revolutions, including the evolution of their scientific languages, can be found in:
Jedynak (2012).
3 The first of these works entitled ‘‘On linguistic philosophy’’ is the second part of the book On the tools
and objects of knowledge. The second is a slightly modified version published in the Ruch filozoficzny.
See Da˛mbska 19659.
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Da˛mbska’s critique of Ajdkukiewicz’s radical conventionalism
Da˛mbska begins her analysis by recalling the distinction Ajdukiewicz introduced in
‘‘On the Meaning of Expressions’’ between ‘language’ and ‘the act of speaking’
(Ajdukiewicz 1935). He writes about this in the following words:’’Speaking is [I
formulate the author’s assertion as a certain generalization—ZO] either making
sounds in accordance with the vocabulary and rules of syntax of language J (thus a
recorded tape can speak), or producing sounds in a way provided by language J for a
given sound.’’ Ajdukiewicz eliminates these two forms by replacing the first one
with ‘using phrases belonging to J’ and the second with ‘using phrases belonging to
J as J expressions’, and proposes a third, according to which to speak language J is
to use J phrases in accordance with language J and be open to respond to such J
phrases in a manner which is appropriate for J’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 144–145).
Da˛mbska notes that even the above characteristics of language show that, in
Ajdukiewicz’s terms, language is determined not only by vocabulary and syntactic
rules, but an important role here is also played by assigning meanings to the words
of the language. Meaning determines the words used, or to put it more precisely the
meaning of words defines directives concerning how to use them (Ajdukiewicz
1975: Chapter 1: Expressions and Their Meanings). For any language for which the
meaning of words is clearly defined, it is possible to formulate meaning directives.
This happens according to the following scheme:
Only he can combine expressions belonging to language L with meanings
assigned to them who in situations of type L is ready to accept the sentence of
type Z. Whereby ‘X is ready in situation L to accept sentence Z’ is the same as
‘if X in situation L answers a question which places a question mark after the
sentence Z, then X accepts sentence Z’. Meaning directives assign specific
propositions to specific types of data such that the rejection of a sentence can
only take place by violating its meaning’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 145).’’
The situation is such that if someone does not comply with the rules of meaning of
the language designated by the meaning of its words, we have to conclude that he
does not speak the language (Wolen´ski 1985: 192).
Da˛mbska, who defined Ajdukiewicz’s concept of language as immanentist, i.e.
one that does not refer in its semiotic characteristics to the operations of the subject
who uses it to express thoughts or emotions to others, is aware that such an approach
seems to be in contradiction with what has been said above (viz. that language is not
understood in relation to the subject’s operations). However Da˛mbska notes that the
contradiction is only apparent. This is because ‘The behavior of the subject, or
rather the willingness to engage in certain cognitive behavior, to recognize in
certain situations certain sentences, is indeed a sign that someone speaks the
language or is guided by the language directives, but these directives are a priori,
they are the explication of the basic logical conventions obligatory in a given
language’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 146). Da˛mbska notes that the origin of these conventions
is no longer a matter of the concept of language, but rather of their origins. Da˛mbska
claims that the immanentist concept of language brings to the fore syntactic issues,
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i.e., ‘‘a description of the formal structure of what might be called the ideal
language. This is a certain conceptual construction, which finds an adequate
interpretation in the languages of formal systems and an inadequate, approximate
interpretation in natural languages.’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 143).4
According to Da˛mbska, the aforementioned concept of language is guided by the
methodological postulate that language should not be described either from a
transcendent point of view or from the position of some model, which language
would imitate, or from the point of view of the person who uses the language to
express her own experiences or exercize an impact on others. An important notion
of Ajdukiewicz’s concept of language is the concept of meaning directives.
Meaning directives
Ajdukiewicz lists three types of directives: (1) deductive directives; (2) axiomatic
directives, and (3) empirical directives (Ajdukiewicz 1934: 113 ff). Let us quote the
relevant passages: ‘‘A meaning directive cited previously according to the formula
of directive detachment is an example of a deductive meaning directive. It can be
formulated as follows: that only he combines with the words of the Polish language
the meanings assigned to them in the language who is ready to accept the sentence
‘B’ in case he accepts the sentence ‘if A then B’ and its predecessor ‘A’
(Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c:155).’’ In other words, deductive directives are directives
that require acceptance of a given sentence when others have been accepted earlier.
The second group is made up of axiomatic directives. Ajdukiewicz writes:
‘‘In the languages of axiomatic systems there certainly are examples of what
we call axiomatic meaning directives. Namely, for anyone who wants to use
the words of such a system in the sense assigned to them by the language of
the system, it is required to unconditionally accept propositions established as
the axioms of the system. I think, however, that such axiomatic meaning rules
also apply in ordinary colloquial languages. It seems, for example, that for
anyone who by means the words ‘any’ and ‘is’ connects the meaning allocated
to them in Polish, it is required that he is ready to unreservedly recognize any
sentence of the form ‘every A is A’ (Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c: 155).’’
Axiomatic rules require unconditional acceptance of certain sentences, and so
acceptance without reference to reasons. The third group is made up of empirical
meaning directives. These are rules of behavior by which we conduct ourselves
when accepting a given sentence as a result of certain perceptions. ‘‘It seems, one is
progressing according to the directive, recognizing the phrase ‘it hurts’ when
experiencing a toothache’ (Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c: 156).’’
Da˛mbska does not put forward serious critical remarks against Ajdukiewicz’s
concept of meaning directives, accepting the author’s view that these types of
meaning directives do not cover all their kinds. She adds that ‘‘… the right
4 Da˛mbska adds that beyond Ajdukiewicz, the immanentist concept of language is also developed by
Carnap in Der logische Syntax der Sprache.
Da˛mbska’s presentation of Ajdukiewicz’s conception of… 79
123
assignment of meanings in a given language does not specify each meaning, but
rather all of them taken together, more precisely, the sum of the ranges of all the
meanings, since each directive is assigned clearly to its scope. Thus, the range of the
empirical directive is always a set of two elements, these being the data of
experience and the proposition in which the relation indicated in the directive exists
between members of the pair’’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 147).The author emphasizes that in
this concept the meaning directives are, in addition to vocabulary and the rules of
syntax, one of three elements that constitute language.
Another notion of Ajdukiewicz’s concept considered by Da˛mbska is that of open
and closed languages. According to Ajdukiewicz,
‘‘We distinguished furthermore open and closed languages. We call a
language open if there is another language containing all the expressions of the
first one which confers in them the same meaning they posses in the first, and
in which there are also expressions which are not present in the first language,
neither as to form nor as to meaning, and among these expressions at least one
is directly semantically related to some expression also occurring in the first
language. A language that is not open, is called a closed language’’
(Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c: 177).
The terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ come from the fact that in the case of the former, you
can increase the number of its expressions without changing the meaning of those
expressions that are already in it. This is not always possible in the case of closed
languages.
‘‘Open languages can have new expressions (not synonymous with any of
those already present) added to them which are immediately meaning-related
to expressions already present, without thereby altering the meaning of
expressions already present. Closed languages, on the contrary, become
disconnected, when a new non-synonymous expression is added to any of
those already present’’ (Ajdukiewicz 2006a, b, c: 161).
In other words, in an open language certain meaning directives are hidden to some
extent in the meaning of expressions. The concept of open or closed language is
related to the notion of coherent or non-coherent languages.
The relation between expressions may be direct or indirect. If expression W is
semantically related to V and V is related to U, then W is semantically related to U,
however not necessarily directly. We have to admit that the meaning of the expression
W is constituted not only by the directives in which W appears, but also by the directives
in which the expressions V and U appear which are semantically related to W. All such
expressions and directives related to them form a certain well demarcated part of the
language called by Ajdukiewicz an isolated part (fragment). A language is coherent if
none of its proper parts is an isolated fragment. Ajdukiewicz concentrates on coherent
languages as non-coherent languages are always a collection of various languages.
As far as open languages are concerned, we can ask, what happens when we add
new expressions to such languages? We conclude from the concept of an open
language, that if we add to it a new expression, then previous expressions may retain
their initial meaning, and a language remains coherent if, after adding new
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expressions, a language will change into the one in relation to which it was open. After
adding new expressions language becomes richer. It turns out that the total change of
the meaning directives by adding new expressions always results in a change of the
assignment of meanings characteristic for the language. The change in the assignment
of meanings by adding new expressions will not take place only in case: (1) a new
language is non-coherent, (2) the added expression has a translation in one of the
previous expressions; (3) the former language is open to a new language.
Ajdukiewicz also deals with a problem of the mutual translatability of languages.
It is believed that if the two languages S and S0 are coherent and closed and an
expression of one of these languages is translatable into an expression in the other,
then these languages are isomorphic and all expressions of language S have a
translation in S’. Ajdukiewicz believes that languages in the proper sense of the
word are languages which are closed and coherent. Examples of such languages are
the languages of deductive systems, such as the language of the logical calculus.
Natural languages are always made up of a multiplicity of languages in the strict
sense. They do not have a completely clear assignment of meanings to expressions.
Natural languages lack specific meaning directives. According to Da˛mbska, with
few exceptions, even languages of deductive systems fall under the definition of
language proposed by Ajdukiewicz. Therefore, they are mostly open languages.
Da˛mbska indicates a certain essential difficulty with Adukiewicz’s semiotic
concept of language. She writes:
‘‘The meaning of expressions is defined on the basis of language directives,
which determine the structure of the language and the translatability of two
languages. At the same time, some of the directives, the so-called meaning
directives, are determined by the meaning of words. I fear that a certain
ambiguity lurks in the term ‘meaning’’’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 150).
Da˛mbska explains further that Ajdukiewicz’s theory leads to the problem of what
determines what: do the meanings determine the meaning directives of a certain
language, or vice versa, do the meaning directives determine meanings? The answer
to this question depends on whether we treat the process of creating meaning
directives as a procedure whose aim is to reconstruct a property that already exists
in the language, or as a procedure which is but one element in the creation of the
language. If the latter happens, by formulating directives we determine the meaning
of those expressions to which the directives apply.
Ajdukiewicz introduces the concept of conceptual apparatus, by which he means the
class of all the meanings of expressions belonging to a closed and coherent language.5
According to Da˛mbska the notion of conceptual apparatus is a key to bridging
Ajdukiewicz’s semiotic and epistemological considerations. As we know, the notion of
conceptual apparatus is the foundation on which his concept of radical conventionalism
is based, according to which an image of the world, being composed of all the theses of
the language, i.e. the sentences which are accepted on the basis of the language
directives, is not uniquely determined by the experience, but depends on the choice of
conceptual apparatus which is used to model experiential data.
5 On this subject see (Zmyslony 2009).
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The development of Ajdukiewicz’s conception of language
Da˛mbska believed that Ajdukiewicz’s effort to create the so-called immanentist
concept of language, i.e. an asemantic conception in which language is not
understood as a representation of an objective model, was dictated by his conviction
that semantic concepts exhibit an antinomial character (in terms of the antinomy of
heterosemantic words or the liar paradox). Da˛mbska notes that such antinomies
appeared to render impossible the correct correspondence theory of language.
According to Da˛mbska, the development of science enabling the elimination of the
antinomies from semantics inclined Ajdukiewicz to set out on fresh attempts in the
theory of language. These attempts primarily take into account the semantic
function of language. Da˛mbska considers the paper ‘‘Three concepts of definition’
as a characteristic attempt in this regard.
In this study language is treated by the author as a collection of expressions and
the rules appropriate for that language (McCall 1967: 207–231). The concept of
directives is replaced by the notion of deductive inference rules specific to a
particular language. Ajdukiewicz states that the introduction by postulates of a new
phrase in language S is not enough if we want to guarantee the truth of the postulate,
and that the terminological convention itself—the proof of existence of an object
that fulfills the condition imposed by the convention on the denotation of the term—
is also needed. Regarding these attempts b Ajdukiewicz, Da˛mbska states:
‘‘He develops this idea further in the study entitled ‘‘Le proble`me du
fondement des propositions analytiques’’ (Language and Cognition, Vol 2),
where he shows that the analytical notion of analyticity involves a term
relative to the language to which this proposition belongs and can be defined
by means of semantic or syntactic conventions. The concept of language
which I called immanentist treats language only in terms of syntax. A broader
account of the semantic aspect of words leads to a modification of this
concept; or perhaps it only shows that the relational (semantic and pragmatic)
concepts of language are more fundamental’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 151).
In the foregoing quotes Da˛mbska also takes issue with the connection between the
accepted concept of language and the problem of truth. According to her, the meaning
of the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ depends on the general concept of language we adopt.
This shows how important it is for epistemological considerations to adopt this or
some other concept of language; and even more broadly, the choice determines how
representatives of linguistic philosophy develop philosophical issues. Da˛mbska states
that ‘‘…only on the basis of such a correspondence theory of language one can
meaningfully use the classical concept of truth, which for formalized languages
paraphrases Tarski’s semantic conception of truth that W. Stegmu¨ller (Stegmu¨ller
1977: 15 ff) attempted to apply to natural language’’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 152).6
According to Da˛mbska, ‘‘The immanentist concept of language thus leads to the
coherence theory of truth in the syntactic version’’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 156). But, the
author asks, does this syntactic notion of truth (this being what she calls the semiotic
6 Interesting comments on the correspondence conception of truth include Bunge 2012.
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equivalent of a traditional coherence theory of truth) not assume a semantic point of
departure? Da˛mbska comes to the conclusion that this is not necessary. She
concludes ‘‘Only language analysis which takes into account its pragmatic
functions, i.e. a language understood as a sign system used by people to
communicate and to acquire, objectivize, and record the results of cognitive
operations, makes a semantic point of view logically prior’’ (Da˛mbska 1967: 157).
However, Da˛mbska warns that when it comes to the definition of truth, semantic
definition seems to be derivative .
(…) if the considerations set out in this chapter are correct, then we should
agree that any semiotic concepts of truth, relativizing the predicates ‘true’ or
‘false’ to the language to which the sentence belongs, are derivatives with
respect to the epistemological or, in the broad sense of the concept, logical
truth, on the basis of which the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ refer primarily to
propositions, i.e., the logical contents of sentences, and secondarily to
sentences themselves in terms of expressions of the language. Further analysis
of these predicates has to appeal on the one hand to certain ontological
categories, especially the concept of existence, and on the other hand to the
concept of man as the subject of cognitive operations (Da˛mbska 1967: 158).
Linguistic philosophy, claims Da˛mbska, seems to reach the limits of the effective
application of its methods.
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